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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the ways in which the economy has been incorporated into 
the political reasoning and practice of region-building in the Barents Region among 
experts. While economic regionalism has been a key strand of studies on historic re-
gionalism, this is not the case for the Barents Region. Yet, the natural resources of the 
region continue to raise high expectations about cross-border economic cooperation 
and development. Full appreciation of any regional development is underpinned by re-
search and knowledge combining both political and economic considerations, but this 
basis is somewhat less solid in the Barents area. The knowledge base about the region 
and its development is therefore fragmented, limited and partial. This is an obvious 
problem, as many of the recent developments in the Barents Region, and also in the 
larger Arctic context, relate to economic opportunities, cooperation and development 
with implications also for political cooperation and governance. The paper analyses the 
development of political Barents studies from early 1990s until today, in particular its 
relation with economic developments in the region.
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INTROduCTION
The Barents Euro-Arctic Region was established in 1993 on political grounds as a region 
for cooperation on security and sustainable development in Northern Europe. It is a 
product of the 1990s era of “new regionalism”, which advocated comprehensive, multi-
sectoral and inclusive region-building (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000). Knowledge and 
expertise on the region was essential for the establishment of the Barents in the early 
1990s, and the relationship between scholars and political region-builders in the Barents 
Region was “intimate” (Tunander 2008, 171). Experts participated in region-building 
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through publications, networking, conferences and exchanges with decision-makers 
supporting intellectual practices “integral to the processes of regionalism” (Larner and 
Walters 2002, 423). In general, regional political studies were characterised by a geopoliti-
cal approach combined with constructivism (Tunander 2008; Moisio and Harle 2010). 
One of the defining features of Nordic academic endeavour in the 1990s was the inter-
est in identity politics, evident in political Barents studies as well. The integration of 
economic and more cultural, identity-based explanations into studies of regionalism 
has been a controversial issue. An example of these difficulties is the exchange be-
tween Christine Ingebritsen (1998) and Nordic scholars in the early 2000s (Tiilikainen 
2001; Neumann 2001), who disagreed about the use of cultural and economic factors 
in explaining the Nordic states’ integration to the European Union. In Barents Studies, 
analyses of economic cooperation and development are often kept as a feature of func-
tional cooperation, as a topic separate from other forms of regional cooperation such as 
administrative and cultural collaboration (Dahström et al. 1995). In the larger context 
of Arctic studies, it is also a current challenge to combine administrative, cultural and 
functional aspects of regionalism. Arctic research is mostly dominated by geopolitical 
and governance perspectives in tackling regional development.
This paper explores the ways interactions between political and economic aspects of 
regionalism have been described, discussed and constituted by regional experts. This 
combination of economic and political dimensions of regionalism can be discussed 
within the framework of “governmentalisation of a region”, which emphasises the con-
tribution of knowledge and research in region-building. In order to govern a region, one 
needs knowledge about the region as a whole, its main elements and characteristics and 
connections between various developments in and outside the region. Governmentality 
studies (Foucault 1991a; b) provide both a theoretical approach and a methodology to 
study knowledge about regional governance.
The material studied in this paper covers primarily Nordic academic literature on the 
Barents Region from the early 1990s until today. Russian literature has not been in-
cluded. Over the years, academic interest in the Barents Region has varied. In the 1990s, 
much of the research material was published in collections of articles, in multidiscipli-
nary books such as The Barents Region: Regional cooperation in Arctic Europe, edited by 
Tunander and Stokke (1994); The Barents Region: Security and economic development 
in the European North, edited by Dellenbrant and Olsson (1994); and The East‒West 
Interface in the European North edited by Dahlström, Eskelinen and Wiberg (1995). The 
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books represented and combined knowledge produced by historians, political scientists 
and geographers and many others. The connection to everyday political developments 
was a close one, and the experts followed these developments carefully.  Several books 
on the economic geography of the region were also published at the time (Seppänen 
1995, Jumppanen and Hyttinen 1995; Lausala and Valkonen 1999; Statistics Finland and 
Goskomstat 2001), constituting the region as a rich resource region with potential for 
economic cooperation and further resource use.
In the 2000s, possibly reflecting a general change in academic publishing practices, most 
of the contributions directly related to the Barents have been single articles in peer-
reviewed international journals. Another feature of the 2000s is that the books dealing 
with the Barents Region are connected to the overall political development in Northern 
Europe, examples being Remaking Europe in the margins: Northern Europe after the en-
largements, edited by Christopher Browning (2003) and The European Union and the 
making of a wider Northern Europe by Pami Aalto (2011). The driving force for this lit-
erature is academic debate, concepts and theories, not a connection to political develop-
ments – perhaps because those developments have been more modest than in the 1990s. 
The only exception here is Norway, whose new High North policies since the mid-2000s 
have attracted the interest of political scientists (Jensen 2013).
It is striking that the Barents Region is not analysed in economic terms in the recent 
literature discussing the nature and development of Arctic economies (Glomsrød 
and Aslaksen 2006; 2008; Political economy of northern regional development 2010; 
Megatrends 2011). There is a multitude of assessments, studies and reports tackling the 
Barents Region and different aspects of its development, such as energy and transpor-
tation. These reports are called “grey literature”, but they benefit from and use political 
science expertise. The political expertise on the region has focused on the effectiveness 
of the existing institutions (Aalto et al. 2011; Aalto, Blakkisrud and Smith 2009a; 2009b). 
A recent development, under the auspices of the Arctic Council and Arctic Monitoring 
and Assessment Programme (AMAP), is to produce a pan-arctic integrated assessment 
report, including a Barents-focused sub-report, by 2017. In this “Adaptation actions for a 
changing Arctic”  (AACA) report, the aim is to assess both environmental and socioeco-
nomic changes in the short term (2030) and long term (2080), to produce scenarios for 
regional development, evaluate impacts and adaptation to them, and identify adaptation 
measures needed. This is a report that seeks to combine multidisciplinary and multi-
sourced lay and indigenous knowledge – including scientific knowledge – and to produce 
policy-relevant information for support adaptation measures.
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GOvERNMENTAlISATION By kNOwlEdGE
One of the intriguing aspects of Michel Foucault’s idea of governmentality is his de-
scription of it as the “introduction of economy into political reason” (Foucault 1991a, 
92). For political scientists, the economy is often understood as a pre-political, clearly 
definable and separate area of activity from the sphere of politics. The idea of govern-
mentality challenges this separation. Goede (2003) suggests that the economy should 
instead be seen as socially and discursively constructed, and closely connected to the 
political sphere. Most importantly, from this perspective the economy is not an or-
ganisation or a process outside of or at odds with the state and regional cooperation. 
From the point of view of governmentality, the “economy” appears as “an inextrica-
ble, but also very invisible part of modern political rationalities” (Tellman 2009, 5). 
At issue is not a particular economic fact, theory or approach by economists, but “the 
very structure of association established between political reason and truth” (Tellman 
2009, 15). The economy should be seen as “a machine for seeing, whose epistemologi-
cal privileges, lines of exclusion and technologies of knowledge need to be dissected” 
(Tellman 2009, 8).
The role of experts is important here, as they translate the relationship between politics, 
economy and region through language. Language works as “a translation machine”, 
establishing a kind of identity and mutuality between political rationalities and regula-
tory aspirations (Miller and Rose 1990, 6). Governmentality relies for governance on 
intellectual practices, which are based on knowledge, research and experts. This being 
the case, governmentality directs our attention to specific kinds of knowledge and ex-
perts in governmental activity – not only within the territories of certain states, but 
beyond state boundaries. Governmentality requires or must articulate some knowledge 
of the reality in which it seeks to govern (Gordon 1980, 248; Miller and Rose 1990, 
6‒7). The region needs to be known in order to be governed. Therefore, knowledge 
plays a fundamental role in “rendering aspects of existence thinkable and calculable 
and amenable to deliberated initiatives” (Miller and Rose 1990, 3). Governmentality 
works through the “particular way in which it conceptualizes the space, objects and 
subjects of the domain in which it is to operate, such that they become governable at a 
distance” (Donegan 2006, 31).
Governmentality is relational: it is about organising things and their relations, such 
as territory, region, resources, people and wealth (Foucault 1991a; 2009). The need to 
govern these relations has to be established to justify intervention. Miller and Rose 
(1990, 6) note that “before one can seek to manage a domain such as an economy it is 
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first necessary to conceptualize a set of processes and relations as an economy which 
is amenable to management”. Discourse on the economy – made of objects, subjects, 
concepts, strategies and enunciative modalities – should be conceived of as doing 
something, as a practice “in a describable relationship with a set of other practices” 
that entail an art of government (Foucault 1991b, 63‒64). The relational approach in 
governmentality makes a region into “a vibrant entity” instead of a static terrain, but 
also an object of calculation (Elden 2007, 575). This is much the case of the Barents 
Region, presented often as a rich resource region with potential to fulfil the needs of 
international, even global markets. Governmental reason is related to a particular way 
of thinking, reasoning and calculating.
The governmentality approach focuses on the identification of an issue as a problem, 
in this case as a combination of economic and other considerations; the need to engage 
and network between various governmental and societal actors to solve the issue, and 
the production of identities and agencies in connection to the efforts to solve the issue 
(Colebatch 2002). My analysis discusses material produced by regional experts, mostly 
political scientists but also some others such as economic geographers, to discuss re-
gionalism in the Barents Region, political developments and future of the region. The 
material is restricted in the sense that: 1) the material chosen to the analysis had to 
discuss the region as a whole, not any particular part of it; 2) the material chosen for the 
analysis did not deal with only one sector of economic activity, such as oil and gas, for-
estry or something else and 3) the material chosen for analysis was written in English, 
not in any national languages in the region. This meant that the material analysed was 
manageable in size and discussed the region and its development as a whole. These 
restrictions also meant that a large part of existing literature on Barents Studies was 
left outside of the analysis, but this literature did not focus on the relationship between 
political and economic aspects of regionalism.
I claim that regionalism in the Barents Region should be understood as a very limited 
mode of governance, as an example of “neoliberal regionalism” (Larner and Walters 
2002) with specific requirements for knowledge about the region. A region in the neo-
liberal sense is built both politically and economically as a part of the global economic 
space through free mobility of goods, people and capital and in the frames of global 
markets and international competition (Larner and Williams 2002; Larner 2000; Cotoi 
2011). According to Larner and Walters (2002, 415), “neoliberal” regions govern them-
selves from a distance by interaction, communication and reform within and between 
authorities, companies and non-governmental organisations.
87The need To know: GoverninG a reGion and iTs economyMONICA TENNBERG  |  Pages 82–97
Using a governmentality approach, two discourses can be identified in Nordic Barents 
research: the need to be governed and the need to have an identity. These needs are 
in my interpretation indicative of neoliberal regionalism and governmentalisation of 
the region by intellectual practices. The problems of establishing regional governance 
over an economy result in governance through self-identification. The efforts to govern 
regionally need to be justified by knowledge, that is, by turning issues into political 
and governable problems with the help of knowledge and experts. The mismatch with 
the needs for knowledge for governance and political aims at distant governance are 
at odds: the result is that we know very little exactly what is happening in the Barents 
Region as a whole. Although the Barents Region has a relatively strong educational 
and research basis with many universities and other educational institutes, even today 
knowledge about the region is fragmented, partial and limited. It is difficult to obtain 
an overview of the region and its development. This is for a reason, I argue. The limited 
knowledge base about the region serves a neoliberal agenda of regional development 
and cooperation based on the idea of governance at a distance, non-intervention and 
self-identification.
ThE NEEd TO BE GOvERNEd – AT A dISTANCE
One of the early academic ideas for regional cooperation in the Barents Region was 
“transregionalisation” (Svensson 1995; Wiberg 1996). A trans-region is an integrated 
political and economic region which has strong internal networks yet is connected 
to global markets. Transnational regionalisation is a political-economic process in-
volving actors from both the political and economic domains whose relationships 
are important to the outcome of the process (Svensson 1995, 58; Aalbu and Wiberg 
1997, 87‒88). There were doubts about the opportunities of transregionalisation in the 
Barents Region. Rune Castberg (1994, 112) warned that “the complementarity of the 
economies of the various parts of the region is only partial. This puts a limit on the 
scope of such cooperation”. Economic cooperation between the northern parts of these 
countries is limited “due to structural similarity, export specialization and established 
patterns of integration in other geographical directions” (Dahlström, Eskelinen and 
Wikberg 1995, 2). The economic connections between the northern and southern parts 
of each country in the region are far more significant than those across the region and 
its boundaries.
The transregionalisation of the Barents Region would have required strong regional 
governance, in particular regional agency. Castberg (1994, 111) has pointed out that 
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“there is a strong need to control, direct and release the cooperative forces in the 
region”. Svensson (1995, 70) stresses the importance of the regional level in supporting 
economic cooperation, observing that “in the Barents Region, the regional level is the 
dominating operative level”. Lacking financial resources on a sub-national level makes 
the development of cooperation difficult. In Svensson’s assessment, at the inter-regional 
level the Barents Regional Council has not yet managed to find or even identify its role, 
particularly in relationship to transnational business (Svensson 1998, 259). According 
to the experts, regional cooperative bodies have invested their resources in matters 
on which they have very little influence instead of seeking a more problem-solving 
function in relation to firms in the region in the early phases of cooperation. Svensson 
(1998, 260) argues that “an indirect, even passive government role in matters of trans-
national business, is thus not a solution good enough for accomplishing true economic 
integration in complicated cross-border contexts”. Lausala and Jumppanen (1998, 78) 
conclude that the political nature of Barents cooperation has led to the “political inter-
ests of states [being] combined with the mainly economic, functional interests of the 
region. This has not been easy in the Barents cooperation”.
In the mid-1990s, it was noted that “the possibilities of economic integration and 
cooperation remain limited and little progress has been made so far” (Lausala and 
Jumppanen 1998, 80). The experts were divided on the issue of the best regional strate-
gies: to be self-sufficient or to open to global markets (Lausala and Valkonen 1999; 
Lausala and Jumppanen 1998, 75). In this sense, the fear in the late 1990s was that the 
region faced the threat of becoming “increasingly marginalized in the global economy” 
(Lausala and Jumppanen 1998, 75) due to slow and vulnerable economic development 
that relied on natural resource extraction. The concern remains in the 2010s whether 
the region is too vast to be integrated as whole; partial integration may be possible, 
however, whereby the Barents Region would be seen as comprising sub-regions, more 
or less integrated to the world economy (Wiberg 2013).
In the late 1990s, the Nordic countries discussed integration in the European Union 
context as an option for the Barents Region. In Wiberg’s (1996, 204) view, “The EU 
policy to support functional integration programs for transnational regions could be 
the most useful reference and guide to similar integration efforts”. EU programmes pro-
mote a neoliberal agenda of economic growth with diverse regional effects (Filtenborg, 
Gänzle and Johansson 2002; Johansson-Nogues 2009). Wiberg concluded in 2002 (82) 
that the accession of Sweden and Finland to the EU and the development of the EU’s 
Northern Dimension “added more political and administrative capacity for dealing 
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with the complicated needs for restructuring of local and regional economies” in the 
Barents Region. However, he went on to point out (Wiberg 2002, 83) that the role of 
regional bodies depends to a major extent on the financial resources and degree of 
decision-making capacity given to them by the governments of the four countries and 
the EU. He continued (2002, 83) that “up to now very limited financial resources and 
decision-making power have been decentralized directly to these institutions”. The 
effort to Europeanise the Barents Euro-Arctic Region did not succeed after 2006, when 
the EU’s attention was turned toward the Arctic (Palosaari and Möller 2004).
Svensson (1995, 68) notes that in the Barents Region dependency on national govern-
ments and international institutions is high: “In other words, the fate of this region is to 
a great extent decided elsewhere, mainly confirming a long tradition of these peripheral 
areas’ dependency on subsidies from central governments”. For example, federal poli-
cies have affected the Russian regions and their possibilities for regional cooperation: 
“all federal political changes, for instance concerning foreign relations and policies on 
promoting foreign investments and trade, will also greatly affect regional development 
in the Barents territories” (Lausala and Valkonen 1999, 227). Indra Øverland (2008) 
points to the fact that some of the most important economic developments in the region 
have been “irrelevant to the multilateral cooperation in the region”. A case in point is 
the development of the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea. Øverland concludes that 
“all discussion about Shtokman and other major petroleum developments in the north 
is generally disconnected from the Northern Dimension, the Barents cooperation, the 
Arctic Council and other multilateral frameworks for collaboration”. Many of the most 
important political and economic changes have happened outside the region. Slow 
progress in Russian negotiations for WTO membership, the past and current complica-
tions in EU‒Russian relations, domestic disagreements on sharing power and resources 
for regional and environmental cooperation, among other things, and increasing in-
ternational interest in the Arctic have influenced the way Barents governmentality has 
developed over the years. The region is seen as part of the global economic space, but 
is governed “at a distance”.
ThE NEEd TO hAvE AN IdENTITy
One distinctive trend in Nordic IR research is a “tidal wave of identity studies, which 
swept over the Nordic region in the early and mid-1990s” (Friedrichs 2004). This 
is also true for studies on the Barents Region (Tunander 1994; Hønneland 1995, 
1998; Tunander 2008). The constructivist approach to regionalism, typical of the 
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Nordic scholarship, claims that “regions are defined in terms of speech acts; they are 
talked and written into existence” (Neumann 1994). In economic terms, the “Barents 
Region” has multiple meanings, but is most often described as a resource region. A 
bold Finnish statement from 1995 claims that “the Barents Euro-Arctic Region is 
today one of the world’s most interesting regions economically” (Seppänen 1995, 3). 
This attraction lies in “the huge economic potential offered by the natural resources 
of North-West Russia” (Seppänen 1995, 3). The region was depicted as comprising 
resource regions that serve global markets, complementing rather than compet-
ing with each other. Castberg (1994, 103) described the Barents Region as made of 
“open economies, with undiversified production structures and high dependence on 
externally produced goods and services”. In his view, the region was “marked by a 
balanced asymmetry: an uneven but partly complementary distribution of various 
material and non-material resources”. Moreover, this asymmetry could be “the key 
driving force for economic cooperation in the Barents Region” (Castberg 1994, 104). 
From the perspective of neoliberal governmentality, as “a rich resource region”, the 
Barents Region serves European and global markets, making the feature a regional 
marker (see Larner and Walters 2002, 413). As an exception to this general view, 
Lehtinen (2003, 37) has provided a positive interpretation of the Barents Region: “It 
has been established as an arena formulating economically feasible alternatives to the 
postcolonial regional division of labour”.
While the natural resources of the region were identified as the basis for coop-
eration, the state of the Barents environment was a common concern. This was 
closely linked to the need for investments to upgrade production facilities and 
infrastructure (Lausala and Valkonen 1999, 17; see also Brunland et al. 2004, 65). 
There were many reasons for investors to steer clear of the region rather than 
to invest in it (Lausala and Valkonen 1999; Jumppanen and Hyttinen 1995, 159; 
172) if they calculated the risks and benefits: unclear ownership rights of natural 
resources and the principles governing their exploitation; the need to develop 
and harmonise commercial and economic legislation, especially legislation on 
foreign investments and projects; incomplete and underdeveloped infrastructure; 
and the lack of support for new enterprises and collaboration. The development 
of the Barents Region was viewed by some writers as being very dependent on 
Russian developments: “The future development of the Barents territories is very 
dependent on general economic and political conditions prevailing in the Russian 
Federation and also partly on cross-border cooperation in North Europe” (Lausala 
and Valkonen 1999, 19). 
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However, despite its economic potential, the Barents Region is not seen as a market. 
According to the experts, the attractiveness of the territory as “a market” for imported 
goods and services is limited due to the dispersed population, low level of economic 
diversification and weak buying power of consumers (Aalbu and Wiberg 1997; Wiberg 
2002, 83). In Wiberg’s view, “the comparative advantages of the regional economies are 
based on the presence of natural resources, which serve markets far away”. In a simi-
lar vein, Brunland and colleagues (2004, 57) note that the Barents economy is based 
“mainly on isolated pockets of natural resource exploitation and primary processing, 
including minerals, forestry and fishing [and that] [d]ue to low population density, 
dispersed location of resources, limited infrastructure, and the legacy of the socialist 
planning, it is difficult to speak of ‘the Barents Market’”.
In the 2010s, the Barents Region has expanded to include the Barents Sea area, which 
is not covered by the frame of cooperation. The economic focus has been redirected 
from the Barents Region itself to the Barents Sea, most likely because the delimitation 
agreement between the Norwegian and Russian governments in 2010 made economic 
use of the Sea possible. The Barents Sea is depicted as a site of varied economic activi-
ties, such as oil and gas exploration and fisheries (Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2006, 2008; 
Megatrends 2011). According to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment report (2009, 
75), the Barents Sea has “the highest concentrations of marine activity in the Arctic 
region”, including bulk cargo carriers, oil tankers, LNG carriers, coastal ferries, fish-
ing vessels, cruise ships and other smaller vessels. The calculative logic of the region 
focuses on the assessments of when the Arctic Ocean will be free of sea ice and the 
Northern Sea Route will open for shipping year round. Instead of being viewed as a 
territory filled with valuable resources, the Barents Sea, with the opportunities it offers, 
now constitutes a site of activity, furnishing the basis of a calculative logic. With the 
heightened interest in its marine area, the Barents Region is seen in a global context 
as offering transportation routes as well as natural and human resources for the global 
economy (Kazantseva and Westin 1994; Nijkamp and Rodenburg 2011).
We therefore see the Barents Region described as a resource region, a region to be 
developed, a transregion and a European region – and many other characterisations of 
the regional identity are on record. Scholars have debated whether it is a functional, ad-
ministrative or identity region (Dahlström, Eskelinen and Wiberg 1995; Wiberg 2013; 
Castberg 1994; Wiberg 1994; Svensson 1995) or some combination of the three. The 
economy is considered to be a central part of a region’s functional identity. These dis-
cussions play a role in governing the region, its resources and people through a process 
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of regional identity-building. Experts have contributed to inventing and operationalis-
ing regional governance, first by being involved in attempts to implant such identity-
building practices and, second, by promoting self-regulation in a way that minimises 
the need for direct political intervention (Miller and Rose 1990, 14‒15).
NEOlIBERAl GOvERNMENTAlISATION Of ThE BARENTS REGION
ThROuGh kNOwlEdGE
Knowledge – in various forms such as maps, statistics and interpretations of available 
information – helps us to know the Barents Region and render it an object of govern-
ance. However, knowledge about the region and its development is partial, limited and 
fragmented. It is very difficult to have an overview of the region and its development 
as a whole. This allows us to maintain the view of the region as “a rich resource region”. 
The scholarship has furthered this self-identification in the name of a European or 
global resource region, which makes this particular feature of the region a regional 
marker (see Larner and Walters 2002, 413). Most importantly, the academic debate 
about regional identity helps the self-identification of the region: governing operates 
through agencies committed to the regional idea of a “resource region”. The fragment-
ed nature of knowledge and knowledge production in the Barents Region supports 
non-intervention. Knowledge is needed for governmental intervention, but neoliberal 
governmentality promotes non-intervention. In terms of governmentality, a region 
emerges as a site of competing political strategies and as an instrument of government 
(Larner and Walters 2002, 423) such as the needs to be governed, practices of distant 
governance and regional identity politics. I claim that the best way to understand the 
region is through the idea of neoliberal regionalism and its relationship to knowledge 
production as a means of governance. From this perspective, the Barents Region is not 
necessarily only a rich resource region, but a region made up of fragmented peoples, 
resources and territories linked by many asymmetrical relations, flows and networks 
of political and economic power (refer Larner and Williams (2002, 411). The research 
should reflect this multitude of issues, connections and developments in the region 
better than before. 
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